of "searching" for them, then "destroying" them, and the body count would be the measuring tool to determine the success of the strategy of "search and destroy". It is common practice among military forces to enforce strict rules on a search and destroy mission.
It became an offensive tool, crucial to General William Westmoreland's second phase. In his three-phase strategy, the first consisted of slowing down Vietcong forces; the seocnd was to resume the offensive and destroy the enemy; the thrid was to restore the area under South Vietnamese government control. The Zippo missions were mainly assigned to the second phase around 1966 and 1967, along with operations "Clear and Secure".
Search and destroy missions entailed sending out platoons, companies, or larger detachments of US troops from a fortified position to locate and destroy Vietcong or NVA units in the countryside. These missions most commonly involved hiking out into the "boonies" and setting an ambush in the brush, near a suspected VC trail. The ambush typically involved the use of fixed Claymore Antipersonnel Mines, crossing lines of small arms fire, mortar support, and possibly additional artillery support called in via radio from a nearby firebase.
In Feb. 1967, some of the largest Zippo missions was operated in the Iron Triangle, located between Saigon and Routes 13 and 25. The area consisted of a mass center of Vietcong logistics and headquarters, with some of the most high-ranking NLF officials stationed there. The offensive began with Operation Junction city, where the American units assigned had destroyed hundreds of tons of rice, killed 720 guerillas, and captured 213 prisoners. however, the Iron Triangle area's defenders was thought to be over 10,000. The offensive failed to destroy the NLF's headquarter nor capture any high-ranking officer, therefore having little effect toward Hanoi's plan. Both search and destroy and clearing missions stretched into the third phase beginning in 1968. The number of missions mounted, especially after the US was hit by General Vo Nguyen Giap's Tet Offensive attack of 1968. As the war grew more aggressive, so did the missions, to the point where there was lack of distinction between search and destroy and clear and secure operations.
Search and destroy missions had many flaws. First, there was lack of distinction between "clearing" and search and destroy missions. Thus, "clearing" and search and destroy missions, pacification was not pushed. Guenter Lewey, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachuesetts Amherst, argued that the generals and war planners severely underestimated the enemy's abilities to match and exceed US forces. Large numbers of Vietcong troops would be killed or captured, but they were quickly replaced. Although enemy forces were initially pushed out of certain territories, as soon as the American forces left the areas, they simply returned with more reinforcements and weapons.
The effectiveness of the missions are also doubtful. In one of the first search and destroy missions northwest of Dau Tieng, named Operation Attleboro, US report states that 155 US soldiers were killed, while the North Vietnamese lost 1,106. In Operation Junction City, the report also states the 282 US soldiers were killed while the Vietcong lost 1,728 guerillas. These figures, however, should be considered in light of the methods by which they were obtained. The estimates were almost exclusively gathered by indirect means: sensor readings, sightings of secondary explosions, reports of defectors or POWs, and inference or extrapolation.